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1Abstract
Exchanges and other trading platforms are often vertically integrated to carry out trad-
ing and settlement as one operation. We show that these vertical silos can prevent the
full realization of eﬃcincy gains from horizontal consolidation of trading and settlement
platforms. Independent of the gains from such consolidation, when costs of settlement
are private information, a merger of vertical silos cannot be designed to always ensure
eﬃcient trading and settlement after the merger. Furthermore, we show that eﬃciency
can nevertheless be guaranteed either by delegating the operation of settlement plat-
forms to agents or by forcing competition across vertical silos through cross-listings.
Keywords: Clearing and Settlement; Cross-listing; Horizontal and Vertical Integration; Mechanism
Design
JEL Classiﬁcations: C73, G20, G34, L22
21 Introduction
Lately, clearing and settlement systems have received a lot of attention in the context of
ﬁnancial integration of the Euro-area. These systems lie at the core of ﬁnancial markets
infrastructure and typically show a complex organization especially for enabling trades across
borders and diﬀerent systems. The Giovannini Reports (2001) and (2003) discovered sizeable
transaction costs and risks in the current infrastructure for clearing and settlement that
prevent eﬃcient cross-border trading within Europe.
Using data on fees and price schedules, Malkam¨ aki, Schmiedel and Tarkka (2002) report that
settlement of domestic securities transactions in Europe is 33% more costly than in the US.
The average fee per transaction settled is $3.9 in Europe compared to only $2.9 in the US.
This diﬀerence is partly explained by the segmentation of the European market, where each
country uses a domestic Central Security Depository. For cross-border transactions within
Europe, settlement is carried out either by intermediaries or international Central Security
Depositories with charges averaging approximately $40 per transaction. Furthermore, looking
at economies of scale in Europe and the US, Malkam¨ aki, Schmiedel and Tarkka (2002) present
compelling evidence that clearing and settlement in the latter area takes place at a much more
eﬃcient level. This leads to the conclusion that Europe can gain immensely from further
consolidation of this infrastructure.
Based on the two Giovannini reports, a policy debate developed emphasizing that “the pro-
cess of consolidation of ... [the] clearing infrastructure should be driven by the private sector,
unless there are clear signs of market failures” (European Central Bank (2001), p.4). In par-
ticular, the strategy for achieving eﬃciency gains is mainly based on mediating horizontal
consolidation among national, private providers of clearing and settlement. While competi-
tive pressures are deemed important, co-operation is seen as essential for attaining eﬃcient
solutions through horizontal consolidation.
In this paper, we point out that there are limits for providers of ﬁnancial infrastructure in
Europe to co-operate in order to achieve eﬃciency. In particular, we ﬁnd that it is impossible
to reap the full gains of horizontal consolidation whenever trading, clearing and settlement
3take place in segmented, vertically integrated exchanges and costs for trading, clearing and
settlement are private information.
Our model departs from the situation in Europe when ﬁnancial markets were characterized
by a high degree of segmentation. Each country had its own clearing and settlement in-
frastructure, and most national corporations had little choice but to list on their national
exchange. Consequently, national exchanges could capture national markets with all trades
carried out at the exchange and channeled through a national clearing and settlement system.
Technology for clearing and settlement was not homogeneous across countries, and systems
often applied specialized solutions which lead to costs being non-transparent and diﬃcult to
compare.
More formally, we consider two players each operating a vertically integrated exchange. These
exchanges oﬀer trading as well as clearing and settlement of trades in two completely sepa-
rated markets. They contemplate a consolidation of their trading and settlement activities,
according to which they would pool their technology. We call such consolidation a merger.
A merger between the ﬁrms is beneﬁcial, since it increases overall proﬁts due to two reasons.
First, we allow for the merger to increase the joint demand for trading of the two ﬁrms and,
hence, to generate higher joint revenue. Second, the costs for settling trades can be diﬀerent
across ﬁrms. Hence, a merged ﬁrm can settle trades at the lower cost of the two ﬁrms. The
costs for settling trades are, however, private information of the players. Furthermore, we
assume that the captive nature of the market by exchanges leads to prices not completely
revealing cost structures. These assumptions capture the nature of specialized settlement
solutions with non-transparent cost structures as well as high segmentation of markets.
Using a result of Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983), we show that there is no mechanism that
allows the players to merge the vertically integrated ﬁrms such as to guarantee that trading
and settlement are produced eﬃciently after the merger. Interestingly, this is independent of
the overall gains in revenue that are obtained from increasing overall demand for the merged
ﬁrms. It is important to stress here that this result is not about the possibility of a merger
per se, but about achieving an eﬃcient merger, i.e. a merger that realizes all possible beneﬁts
associated with the merger.
4The reason for this result is as follows. A merger has to specify how the overall joint revenue
is shared between the players and which of the two ﬁrms provides the settlement of trades
after the merger. For the merger to be eﬃcient, the players have to ensure that the lowest cost
ﬁrm will carry out settlement. Since the costs for settlement are private information, truthful
revelation of the costs implies that the share of revenue a player obtains varies with the costs
announced by a player. However the total post-merger revenue net of production cost is
constant. Therefore, it is infeasible to give proper incentive to both players simultaneously,
since what is granted to one cannot be granted to the other and vice versa.
We oﬀer three ways to overcome the problems of asymmetric information about costs together
with a vertically integrated structure. First, if a subsidy is available to vary the overall gains
from merging, the incentives to reveal the costs can be restored. Second, we prove that
each player has an incentive to merge the trading platforms, if each player can delegate the
operation of his settlement platform to an agent which we assume to be an insider (i.e., we
assume that the agent can observe the true cost of settlement). By paying the agents a (small)
share of the proﬁts, competition for settling trades reveals costs. This results in the eﬃcient
solution where trading platforms are merged, while all trades get settled at the lowest cost.1
The third alternative requires the two players to oﬀer trading and settlement to the whole
market and not only to their own market segment. This proxies for cross-listing between the
two vertically integrated exchanges. Again, competition leads to prices that fully reveal costs.
Hence, eﬃciency results as all trading and settlement takes place at the lowest cost.2
Our contribution is, hence, twofold. We show that segmented market structures and special-
ized settlement systems with non-transparent costs are important enough barriers for prevent-
ing national exchanges and settlement providers to achieve eﬃcient consolidation. Moreover,
we emphasize that competition is a powerful tool to overcome the problems associated with
such barriers. We recognize, however, that weakening the degree of market segmentation
1Tapking and Yang (2004) look at other potential solutions to achieve eﬃciency such as establishing links
between settlement systems rather than merging two systems. On this aspect of integration, see also Kauko
(2003) for a related paper.
2On cross-listing and competition between exchanges, see also the recent papers by Shy and Tarkka (2001)
and Santos and Scheinkman (2004).
5by itself will lead to more competition as exchanges can compete directly through strategic
variables such as the choice of settlement technology or attracting more corporations to list
on the exchange.
The recent experience of consolidation among European stock exchanges (which we review in
detail below) seem to support our ﬁndings. The case of Euronext, a merger between the Paris,
Bruxelles and Amsterdam stock exchanges, was accompanied with the vertical disintegration
of these exchanges which originally were set up as vertical structures. A similar project, the
iX trading platform between London Stock Exchange and the Deutsche B¨ orse in Frankfurt,
failed however. Interestingly, Deutsche B¨ orse pursued the creation of a vertical silo in parallel
to the planned merger. Below we describe these recent experiences in more detail and provide
evidence that vertical structures such as Deutsche B¨ orse formed until recently an impediment
to eﬃcient market consolidation.3
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We start our analysis in Section 2 with a
detailed case study of the Euronext and the planned iX merger. Section 3 outlines our model.
We derive the impossibility result of achieving an ex-post eﬃcient merger in Section 4. We
then describe how a subsidy (or a tax) can restore eﬃciency. Section 5 demonstrates how
market solutions can solve the problem of achieving full eﬃciency. The last section concludes.
3Quite interestingly, the policy debate has shifted towards establishing a framework that induces more
competitive pressure while this paper was written. The European Commission has announced its plans to
issue a formal Directive that aims at ensuring unrestricted access to ﬁnancial infrastructures across Europe
where market participant are free to choose the location of settlement independent of trading (see European
Commission (2004)). Our work shows that such a policy can create the competition necessary to achieve an
eﬃcient ﬁnancial market system across the Euro-area.
62 Securities Settlement Systems and the Consolidation
of Securities Markets
2.1 Securities Market Organization - A Brief Overview
Transacting securities involves other actions than simply trading, i.e., buying and selling a
security. For completeness and to demonstrate their importance, we brieﬂy review so-called
back oﬃce services that are necessary to eﬀect a trade in securities markets.
There are two diﬀerent main operations that complete the trade of a security. The ﬁrst one,
clearing the trade, conﬁrms the legal obligations from the trade. Clearing involves (among
possible other services) transmitting and reconciling the terms of a securities’ trade between
the buyer and seller. In some cases this is taken on by a special entity, a clearing house, that
can also function as what is called a Central Counterparty or CCP. This entity interposes
itself as the buyer to every seller and the seller to every buyer of a security.
Following the clearing stage the second operation is settling a trade. This involves the actual
transfer of ownership from the seller to the buyer as well as the payment for the security by
the buyer thereby discharging the legal obligations from the trade. This operation is often
handled by a so-called Central Security Depository (or CSD) that holds the security and
transfers the title of the security from the seller to the buyer after the transaction has been
cleared.
Stock exchanges and other trading platforms often operate in vertical silos oﬀering a one-stop
service to traders. This service ranges from executing a trade over clearing the transaction to
settling it by transferring the title of the security and the payment between the parties of the
trade. In these vertical silos, the stock exchange either directly owns or controls the clearing
house and/or the CSD that are responsible for clearing and settling the trades.
In the context of cross-border transactions the complexity of clearing trades rises considerably.
In such transactions, buyers and sellers (or their brokers) transact on an exchange often
without having direct access to the clearing infrastructure. This necessitates some form of
7intermediation where the intermediary takes on indirectly all the responsibilities arising from
the trade within the clearing process. One possibility is that International CSDs guarantee
the clearing and settlement of such transactions by functioning as specialized intermediaries
between several national CSDs. Alternatively, CSDs can be linked and coordinate among
themselves the clearing of such transactions. Finally, banks and other ﬁnancial institutions
often use their direct access to function as a local intermediary for the foreign party transacting
the security.
2.2 Securities Market Consolidation in Europe - A Case Study
The introduction of a single currency for the Euro-area from 1998 onwards prompted a process
of consolidation within the infrastructure of European securities markets. We give here a brief
overview over this process. Our goal is to demonstrate that questions regarding the ownership
and structure of clearing and settlement arrangements decisively shaped this process.
There are two recent examples from the European experience that indicate why some con-
solidation was successful, while other developments are still unresolved. The ﬁrst one is the
successful merger between the Amsterdam, Bruxelles and Paris stock exchanges labelled Eu-
ronext. The second one is the failed creation of iX, a merger of Deutsche B¨ orse (DB) and
the London Stock Exchange (LSE). In both cases it is striking that settlement arrangements
played seemingly an important - if not decisive - role for the outcome of the merger.
As early as 1998, the LSE and DB expressed their intention to form a joint trading platform
called iX to consolidate the nationally orientated exchanges. Spurred by the promise of
huge cost savings4 the move gathered momentum quickly with six other European exchanges
(Amsterdam, Bruxelles, Madrid, Milan, Paris, Swiss) joining the plan until May, 1999. During
the merger talks between the exchanges, a parallel process was initiated in the area of back
oﬃce operations. CEDEL, an internationally operating settlement agent merged with DB
Clearing in July 1999 to form Clearstream. Shortly after, DB bought a controlling stake
4The LSE for example estimates the total cost savings from consolidation of clearing and settlement in
Europe to be around 1.6bn Euro per year (LSE, 2002).
8(50%) in Clearstream to set up a vertically integrated exchange in Germany.
This move coincides with a reorientation of some other stock exchanges. First, Euronext
was launched in March 2000, when Sicovam, the CSD of the Paris stock exchange, broke
oﬀ merger talks with Clearstream. Shortly afterwards, the iX merger failed seemingly over
problems with ﬁnding the right arrangement on the settlement layer. The Financial Times
reported in their July, 20th 2000 edition that
“Clearstream and Crest [the settlement agent for London’s securities markets]
would make an announcement at the end of August on what clearing and set-
tlement service they intended to oﬀer to users of ... iX. Shareholders of the two
exchanges are already agitating for answers to that essential question. It seems
likely that the solution to be oﬀered will be interim. Such a step would be unlikely
to oﬀer the cost savings that iX is promising,...”
While the iX merger failed, the Euronext merger was completed by September 2000. The
key step was to consolidate clearing and settlement in an independent entity. This was
achieved through incorporating the French, Dutch and Belgian CSDs into Euroclear, the
second major international settlement agent. Euronext has expanded recently to include the
Lisbon exchange as well as the LIFFE, a London based future and derivatives exchange. Both
these acquisitions were accompanied by the merger of the settlement agents, Interbolsa and
Crest, with Euroclear. Finally, in June 2003, the clearing arrangements for Euronext were
consolidated by merging Clearnet, the former French CPP, with its London counterpart, the
London Clearing House (LCH).
Looking back at this experience one is struck by the evidence that the success for consolidation
rested upon ﬁnding a solution for merging not only trading, but also settlement and clearing
arrangements.5 DB’s strategy of erecting a vertical silo seemed to be the main reason that
5As the Financial Times noted on July, 14th 2000, “...[The] integration of Euronext for trading, settlement
and clearing will probably be faster and easier to achieve than for the proposed iX merger...[which] still has
to decide whether it will rely on Crest ... or Clearstream to settle equities. . experts question whether this
is feasible in practice.” On October 25th, 1999 it was stated that “At the heart of the problem has been
9prevented a potential merger to realize eﬃciency gains between LSE and DB. This is backed
best by a recent statement issued by the LSE (LSE, 2002).
“...[The] optimal solution is to create a single system ... that is run as a ‘utility’
and is independent of exchanges and other trading platforms. (p.8) ... Action
is required to impose the separation of trading platforms and clearing and set-
tlement activities. Vertical silos, especially if run as for-proﬁt businesses, have
perverse incentives ... to prevent interoperability and further consolidation at the
clearing and settlement level. Breaking up these silos and separating trading plat-
forms from clearing and settlement systems is a vital preliminary step towards
establishing an eﬃcient market structure. (p.21)”
Why was the Euronext merger then successful? The answer seems again to be buried in
the back oﬃce structures. Euroclear was an independent entity from the start. After the
acquisition of Clearstream by DB, it was the natural catalyst for moving from vertical to
horizontal integration for the Euronext project. The vertical silo structure of DB to the
contrary was a clear disadvantage in leading a consolidation process. As Pierre Francotte,
CEO of Euroclear, expressed it when defending the company’s approach,
“Euroclear believes that horizontal integration, with users rather than stock ex-
changes owning and governing the settlement service providers, is the best way of
achieving the market’s objectives of lower transaction costs and higher eﬃciency.
However, until such time that a pan-European settlement solution is in place, it is
essential for users to have a choice of settlement location for their trade. ... The
vertical silo approach - where stock exchanges own and govern their clearing and
settlement houses - makes settlement location more diﬃcult to achieve. Which
stock exchange or CCP will want to feed business and revenues to a settlement
house that is owned and controlled by one of its competitors?” (The Banker, June
1st, 2002)
disagreement between London and Frankfurt over which electronic trading platform and which clearing and
settlement system to choose.”
10Even though these statements obviously reﬂect particular interests, we feel that they highlight
three important factors. First, major gains from horizontal consolidation of security markets
arise in form of cost savings in the area of back oﬃce operations. Second, ownership of
settlement and clearing operations by exchanges can be an impediment to realize these gains.
Third, breaking up vertically integrated exchanges can be a way to capture the gains from
horizontal consolidation.
3 Environment
We conﬁrm our assessment now by analyzing a simple model that investigates whether ver-
tically integrated ﬁrms can capture all gains from horizontal consolidation. We consider an
economy with two ﬁrms, i = 1,2, owned by player i. Each ﬁrm produces a service, which
encompasses production of a ﬁnal product (here carrying out a trade on a stock exchange) and
distributing the product (here clearing and settling a trade). The cost for a ﬁrm of running
the trading platform is normalized to 0 while the cost of running the settlement platform is
θi, distributed according to a common density function f with support [0,1]. We assume that
θi is private information of player i.
Each ﬁrm is assumed to be initially vertically integrated. If a trade takes place on platform
i, it has to be settled on platform i. For simplicity, we assume that each ﬁrm faces a demand
Di taking the following form: Di = 1 if pi ≤ ¯ p and zero otherwise.6 Hence, there is no
substitution between the products of the two ﬁrms and the demand is inelastic up to price ¯ p.
The proﬁt of player i from operating the ﬁrm is ˜ Πi(θi) = ¯ p−θi. Note that the price does not
reveal the cost of settlement. Hence, player j cannot observe the cost θi from the price ﬁrm
j quotes for trading plus settlement. We assume that ¯ p > 1.7
If the two ﬁrms merge, they can realize an additional demand equal to d ≥ 0. Total demand
6We do not model here any beneﬁts from vertical integration, since these are neither driving nor preventing
our results.
7This assumption can be interpreted as the ﬁrms operating in segmented markets oﬀering a single, indi-
visible good. We discuss this assumption in more detail in the last section of the paper.
11for the merged ﬁrms is then given by 2 + d if p ≤ ¯ p and 0 otherwise. Hence, there are two
potential gains from merging. First, the players could merge the ﬁrms and realize the extra
demand if d > 0. Second, if θ1 and θ2 are diﬀerent the merged ﬁrm could oﬀer settlement
for all the demand at lower cost. Thus, if the costs were common knowledge, then ﬁrm 1
and 2 would merge, satisfy the joint demand of 2 + d at a price p = ¯ p, produce settlement
at min{θi,θj} and realize in all cases a joint proﬁt that is larger than the sum of individual
proﬁts. Costs θi are private information, however, and can not be discovered by merging the
two ﬁrms. This means that the costs do not become common knowledge for the players after
a merger between the ﬁrms is completed.8
4 Impossibility of Ex-Post Eﬃcient Mergers
The beneﬁts from merging can only be exploited if settlement costs are known. In this
section we show that private information on the costs of settlement renders an eﬃcient merger
impossible independent of d. For an eﬃcient merger the additional beneﬁts arise in part from
the use of the most eﬃcient settlement system. These beneﬁts have to be shared among the
two ﬁrms with the size of the beneﬁts depending on the diﬀerence of settlement costs between
the two ﬁrms. With θi being private information, how these proﬁts are shared can, however,
only depend on the costs the ﬁrms announce. Hence, a ﬁrm can inﬂuence its share of the
proﬁt through its announcement of costs. Unless the sharing rule can elicit truthful revelation
of costs, an eﬃcient merger is then not possible.
Using ideas from mechanism design we ask whether there exists a mechanism that can im-
plement the use of the most eﬃcient settlement platform after the merger between the ﬁrms
has taken place. Invoking the revelation principle, we restrict ourselves to studying direct
mechanisms where ﬁrms only make a cost announcement. A direct mechanism is a function
M = (t,y) that speciﬁes for each announcement θ = (θ1,θ2) a transfer rule t(θ) = (t1(θ),t2(θ))
and an allocation rule y(θ) = (y1(θ),y2(θ)) of settlement operations. Given θ, the payoﬀ for
8The often intricate nature of settlement and clearing procedures make it diﬃcult to identify the true costs
of any particular arrangement (see for example Giovannini, 2001 and 2003).
12each player is then given by Πi(t,y|θ) = ti(θ) − (2 + d)yi(θ)θi. We deﬁne further that a
mechanism is Bayesian incentive-compatible if for each i,j such that θi is the true type of i








i,θj)θidF(θj) for all θ
0
i. (1)
Next, a mechanism is feasible if, ﬁrst, it is individually rational, i.e., the expected proﬁt for
each player from merging is at least as high as the proﬁt from not merging,
Z
Πi(t,y|θi,θj)f(θj)dθj ≥ ˜ Πi(θi), (2)
second, the whole return from the merged ﬁrms are distributed between the players
t1(θ) + t2(θ) = (2 + d)¯ p, (3)
third, transfers are feasible, i.e., positive,
ti(θ) ≥ 0 for all θ, (4)
since we assume that the players do not have initial wealth9 and
2 X
i=1
yi(θ) = 1 for all θ, (5)
where yi(θ) ≥ 0 for all i.
Finally, an allocation is ex-post eﬃcient if the settlement platform with the lowest cost carries
out settlement, i.e.,
yi(θ) = 1 if θi ≤ θj and 0 otherwise. (6)
In the sequel we will abuse language slightly by using ‘ex-post eﬃcient merger’ instead of
‘ex-post eﬃcient allocation’ of settlement activities. We then have the following impossibility
result which is an application of a result due to Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983).
Proposition 1. There is no incentive-compatible and feasible mechanism that implements an
ex-post eﬃcient merger between the two ﬁrms.
9Note, however, from the deﬁnition of Πi that the players’ payoﬀs can be negative.
13Proof. Suppose that there exists an incentive compatible and feasible mechanism (t,y), where
y is ex-post eﬃcient. Deﬁne the expected payoﬀ of type θi from taking part in the mecha-
nism given type j reveals his type truthfully as ¯ Πi(t,y|θi) =
R
Πi(t,y|θi,θj)f(θj)dθj. Also
deﬁne the expected probability to produce of a type θi given j reveals his type truth-
fully as ¯ yi(θi) =
R
yi(θi,θj)f(θj)dθj. Similarly, deﬁne the expected transfer to a type θi
as ¯ ti(θi) =
R
ti(θi,θj)f(θj)dθj. From the incentive compatibility constraint (1) we have for all
θi and θ0
i
¯ Πi(t,y|θi) = ¯ ti(θi) − (2 + d)¯ yi(θi)θi ≥ ¯ ti(θ
0





i) = ¯ ti(θ
0








(2 + d)¯ yi(θi)(θ
0
i − θi) ≥ ¯ Πi(t,y|θi) − ¯ Πi(t,y|θ
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which shows that ¯ yi(θi) is non-increasing. Setting θ0




= −(2 + d)¯ yi(θi).
Hence we have that ¯ Πi(t,y|θi) = ¯ Πi(t,y|si) −
R θi
si (2 + d)¯ y(vi)dvi.
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f(θi) if si < θi and θi +
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f(θi) if si > θi.








































¯ ti(θi)f(θi)dθi + (2 + d)
·Z 1
0
¯ yi(θi)θif(θi)dθi − [E(θi|θi ≤ si) + si(1 − F(si))]
¸
.
Hence, the expected payoﬀ of type si is equal to the average pay-oﬀ for player i plus the
surplus his information creates.
Now, let si = 0 for all i. That is we consider the type of ﬁrms that have the least beneﬁt
from merging as they are the most eﬃcient. Total transfers are then given by
Z











From feasibility we have t1(θ) + t2(θ) = (2 + d)¯ p for all θ so that
Z
t1(θ) + t2(θ)f(θ)dθ = (2 + d)¯ p.
This implies that





= (2 + d)¯ p.
Since both ﬁrms have zero cost, the expected proﬁt from an ex-post eﬃcient merger to be
shared is the full return (2 + d)¯ p. Therefore, when both ﬁrms have zero cost it must be that
¯ Π1(t,y|0) + ¯ Π2(t,y|0) = (2 + d)¯ p. This gives a contradiction since ¯ Π1(t,y|0) + ¯ Π2(t,y|0) =




> (2 + d)¯ p.
15This result shows that an ex-post eﬃcient merger can not be implemented between the two
ﬁrms because the incentives of misrepresenting their own costs are too strong. The intuition
of the result is simple. A feasible mechanism that implements an ex-post eﬃcient merger must
specify a transfer that will redistribute the overall proﬁt from production while ensuring that
the lowest cost producer will carry out production. Eliciting truth-telling is however costly.
For instance, a low cost ﬁrm, has an incentive to announce higher than its true costs. In doing
so, it is still likely to produce and, by pretending that costs are higher, it causes total proﬁts
from the cost savings to appear lower than they are. This diﬀerence between apparent proﬁts
and true proﬁts fully accrues to the producing ﬁrm. Hence misrepresenting costs aﬀects the
transfers, but also the remaining proﬁt that a ﬁrm can keep for itself.
Our assumption on limited liability implies that truth-telling can only be elicited using the
revenue from the merger (2 + d)¯ p. This is independent of costs. Hence, what is promised to
one ﬁrm to elicit truthful revelation is not available to set up the incentives of the other ﬁrm
right. As a consequence, for certain combinations of costs, the total revenue from the merger
may not be enough to elicit truth-telling for both ﬁrms. In other words, as the mechanism
has to distribute all the revenue between the two ﬁrms, it is impossible to design transfers
that distribute all the revenue while giving both ﬁrms appropriate incentives to truthfully
reveal their costs.
An interesting property is that the impossibility result does not depend on the magnitude of
the additional demand d. The reason is that d is known by both ﬁrms and is not aﬀected
by the true costs of the producing ﬁrm. Since the total revenue from merging including the
additional revenue ¯ pd must be split between the two ﬁrms, transfers always have to include
all revenue. As ﬁrms are risk neutral, the severity of the incentive problem is unaﬀected by
the magnitude of d. Hence, the costs of eliciting the truth is independent of d. Therefore, the
eﬃcient merger is as diﬃcult to implement when d > 0 as when d = 0.
From the proof of Proposition 1, we can infer, however, that a subsidy can implement a
merger ex-post eﬃciently. Since a subsidy can depend on the ﬁrms’ announcements, the
revenue from the merger plus the subsidy can vary with the announced costs. Whenever the
subsidy is decreasing with the cost one can counteract the incentive to report a high cost in
16order to get a higher payoﬀ. Hence, by changing the total revenue that can be shared between
the ﬁrms, a subsidy will enable the ﬁrms to overcome the informational problem. This is what
we show in the next result, where we assume for simplicity that f is the uniform distribution
on [0,1].
Proposition 2. There exists a subsidy schedule si(θ) for all θ and all i, such that an ex-
post eﬃcient merger is implementable. Furthermore, there exists d∗(¯ p) > 0 such that, for
d > d∗(¯ p), an ex-post eﬃcient merger can be implemented with si(θ) ≤ 0 for all θ and all i.
Finally, d∗(¯ p) → ∞ as ¯ p → 1.
Proof. We now set the transfers to be ti(θ) = τi(θ) + si(θ), where τi(·) is the sharing rule of
the return from the merger and si(·) is the subsidy received. Hence, ¯ τi(θi)+ ¯ τj(θj) = (2+d)¯ p
for all θi and θj. Using a standard result of implementation theory an ex-post eﬃcient merger
is implementable if and only if, for all i
• the function (2 + d)¯ yi(θi) is non-increasing,
• ¯ Πi(t,y|θi) = ¯ Πi(t,y|0) −
R θi
0 (2 + d)¯ yi(vi)dvi for all θi ∈ [0,1] and
• ¯ Πi(t,y|θi) ≥ ¯ p − θi.
where yi(θ) is ex post eﬃcient. Since yi(θ) is ex post eﬃcient, the ﬁrst condition is clearly
fulﬁlled.
We will now derive conditions on ti(·) such that the last two conditions hold. The second
condition implies for yi(θ) being ex-post eﬃcient that ¯ Πi(t,y|θi) − ¯ Πi(t,y|0) = −(2 + d)(θi −
θ2
i/2). Furthermore, by deﬁnition of the average pay-oﬀ for type θi we have ¯ Πi(t,y|θi) =
¯ ti(θi) − θi(2 + d)(1 − θi) for all θ. Thus the second condition is equivalent to





















17Since, by deﬁnition, ¯ ti(θi) + ¯ tj(θj) = (2 + d)¯ p + ¯ si(θi) + ¯ sj(θj), we obtain






where ¯ si(θi) is the expected subsidy received by type θi. Using symmetry, we can then set
the subsidy equal to





and the sharing rule equal to
¯ τi(θi) =
(2 + d)¯ p
2
.
For the third condition to be fulﬁlled, we need ¯ si(0) to be large enough for all i. Indeed,
using the expressions for ¯ si(θi) and ¯ τi(θi), the individual rationality constraint of ﬁrm i can
be rewritten as













Hence, an ex-post eﬃcient merger is implementable with a schedule of transfers {t1(θ),t2(θ)}
such that ¯ ti(θi) = ¯ τi(θ)+¯ si(θ) where ¯ τi(θi) and ¯ si(θi) satisfy the expressions given above. This
proves the ﬁrst part of Proposition 2. To prove the second part, notice that so far we imposed
no restriction on the sign of ¯ si(θi). Hence, we obtain the result by setting ¯ si(0) ≤ 0 and using
the expression above to deﬁne ¯ si(θi). Since ¯ si(0) ≥
(1+d)2
2(2+d) − d
2¯ p, we must have
(1+d)2
2(2+d) − d
2¯ p ≤ 0,
where the left hand side is decreasing in d. The remainder of the result then follows.
This proof clariﬁes further the impossibility result by fully characterizing the symmetric
subsidy needed for establishing ex-post eﬃciency. To balance the incentives of obtaining a
higher share of revenue by claiming higher costs, one has to decrease payoﬀs net of settlement
costs just fast enough with the announced costs. This is best demonstrated when looking at
a negative subsidy or a tax.
Taxing the revenues after the merger reduces the total revenue available for the two players.
By decreasing the pay-oﬀs net of costs appropriately with the announced costs, players do
18not have an incentive to lie anymore. This was not possible when revenues were constant
at (2 + d)¯ p. There, decreasing the share for one player means increasing the share of the
other player. Hence, it is impossible to design the incentive structure simultaneously for both
players if all revenues have to be shared. In other words, with a tax (or subsidy) one can
separate the eﬀects of an announcement of one player on the other and vice versa.
Of course, when taxing the players one might violate individual rationality. Given ¯ p, this is
the case when the gains in revenue from the merger as expressed by d are suﬃciently low.
Whenever this is the case, however, a subsidy can still achieve ex-post eﬃciency, because one
can just make participation more attractive by adding a constant lump sum transfer without
aﬀecting incentives.
5 Achieving Eﬃciency: Market Solutions
In this section, we explore a second way to implement an ex-post eﬃcient merger. The key
idea is here to rely on market solutions where competition leads to prices fully revealing costs.
We assume here that each player can delegate settlement activities to an insider who knows
the costs and competes for carrying out settlement of all post-merger trades. If these agents
have an incentive to reveal the costs when competing for the market, eﬃcient settlement will
occur.
We also show in this section that alternatively a regulator can force the two vertically inte-
grated ﬁrms to compete for the total market. This is important for two reasons. First, it
provides an alternative to splitting up the two silos which might not be optimal if there are
gains from vertical integration. Second, it demonstrates that splitting up the silos is key for
getting the two ﬁrms participating voluntarily in a merger.
5.1 A Bertrand game between settlement platforms
We ﬁrst study whether agents that compete for the market choose a pricing strategy that
fully reveals costs of settlement. Let pi be the price set by agent i running settlement platform
19i. For later reference, we assume that agent i can retain a share αi ∈ (0,1] of proﬁts. Since
the platform with the lowest price will get all the demand for settlement, the payoﬀ of agent
i is then given by
ui(pi,pj) = αi(2 + d)

     
     
(pi − θi) if pi < pj
(pi − θi)/2 if pi = pj
0 if pi > pj.
(7)
We consider the Bayesian Nash equilibria of a game where both agents simultaneously an-
nounce a price pi: For all θi, agent i has to choose a price pi(θi) that is a best response to the
price schedule pj(·) of agent j given the distribution of θj which we choose to be uniform for

























where P(A) denotes the probability of event A. We show next that the price schedule in
equilibrium is strictly increasing and, hence, reveals the settlement costs.
Lemma 1. The equilibrium pricing strategy pi(θi) is continuous and strictly increasing on
[0,1] for all i.
Proof. See Appendix.
Even though this result is suﬃcient to establish that the market solution reveals the costs,
we derive a closed form solution for the equilibrium pricing strategies. This will simplify
the exposition further. As pi(·) is strictly increasing, we can deﬁne φ(p) = p
−1
i (p) = θi as
the inverse function of pi(·). Since it is monotonic, φ(·) is diﬀerentiable almost everywhere.
Setting a price pi, agent i supplies the whole market if pj(θj) > p, i.e., if θj > φj(p). This
occurs with probability 1−F(φj(p)), where F is the distribution of θj. Hence, we can rewrite
agent i’s problem (8) as follows
max
p
(p − θi)[1 − F(φj(p))]. (9)
20Using the fact that θi = φi(p), that F(·) is uniform and the ﬁrst order condition for the above
problem, we obtain
φj(p) = 1 + (φi(p) − p)φ
0
j(p). (10)
Lemma 2. The equilibrium strategies are symmetric, i.e., φi(p) = φj(p) ≡ φ(p) for all p and
φ(1) = 1.
Proof. See Appendix.
Given symmetry, equation (10) can be written as φ(p) = 1+(φ(p)−p)φ0(p) and since φ(1) = 1
we obtain that the unique solution to this diﬀerential equation is φ(p) = 2p − 1. Hence, the
best response function for all agents satisﬁes pi(θi) = (θi + 1)/2.
5.2 Implementing the market solution
We investigate whether it is optimal for the players to separate trading from settlement in
order to fully realize the gains from merging. A market mechanism speciﬁes an action set Ai for
each player i and a market outcome function. The market outcome function describes whether
a merger takes place and whether the players separate trading and settlement. Furthermore,
it speciﬁes transfers to the players, the allocation of production in terms of the prices quoted
by the agents and the proﬁt share the agents obtain. Hence, we denote the outcome function
by a quadruple (m,t,y,α)(a,p), that expresses all these variables as functions of the players’
actions a = (a1,a2) ∈ A1 × A2 and the prices p = (p1,p2) ∈ I R2
+ resulting from the Bertrand
Game between the agents.
The function m(a,p) ∈ {0,1} describes then whether players delegated the operation of the
settlement platform to agents and whether a merger takes place. We let m(a,p) = 1 express
the fact that a merger takes place and agents are hired to operate the settlement platforms.
A market outcome is feasible for m = 0 if, for all a ∈ A such that m = 0, ti(a,p) = ¯ p,
αi(a,p) = 0 and yi(a,p) = 1 for all i. Hence, if a merger does not take place, each ﬁrm settles
its own trades and transfers are given by the revenue from trading.
21Note that after the merger and after splitting oﬀ the settlement platforms, total proﬁts (and,
hence, transfers) consist of the revenue from trading, (2 + d)¯ p and the proﬁts from the set-
tlement operations minus the costs from paying for settlement pi and the fees paid to the
agents. A market outcome is feasible for m = 1 if, for all a ∈ A such that m = 1, transfer
schedules are restricted by limited wealth, i.e.,




yi(a,p) = 1 (12)
and transfer schedules distribute all revenues from the merger between the players,






(1 − αi(a,p))yi(a,p)(pi − θi))]. (13)
Finally, we say that a market outcome is feasible if it is feasible for m = 0 and m = 1. We
then have the following deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 1. A market outcome (m,t,y,α) is strongly implementable if it is feasible and the
unique perfect equilibrium of a market mechanism.
Note that this deﬁnition requires that the market outcome is the equilibrium outcome for all
strategies of the players that form an equilibrium that is trembling-hand perfect. Whenever
the settlement systems are run separately by agents that obtain a strictly positive share of
the proﬁt (m = 1), we have shown that prices pi(θi) are strictly increasing in θi. Hence, prices
fully reveal the costs of settlement. Hence, ex-post eﬃciency requires that yi(a,p) = 1 if and
only if pi < pj. This fact allows us to implement an ex-post eﬃcient merger for all θ.
Proposition 3. An ex-post eﬃcient merger is strongly implementable as a market outcome.
Proof. Consider the following mechanism. Deﬁne the action sets of player i to be Ai = {0,1}
for all i. If any player i chooses ai = 0, set m((0,aj),p) = 0 (i.e. no merger takes place and
no agent is hired), ti((0,aj),p) = ¯ p, yi((0,aj),p) = 1 and αi((0,aj),p) = 0. Player i’s payoﬀ
22is then ¯ p − θi. We have to show that player i obtains a strictly higher pay-oﬀ from choosing
ai = 1 if the other player also chooses aj = 1.
If both players choose 1, set m(1,p) = 1. Set α1 = α2 = α > 0. Given agent i obtains a
share of proﬁts from settlement equal to α > 0, she strictly prefers to maximize proﬁts and
quote the Bertrand equilibrium price pi which is strictly increasing in θi by Proposition 1.
Hence, we can express transfers and settlement decisions equivalently as functions of θ, where
pi =
θi+1
2 for all i. Hence, we can set yi(a,p) = 1 if and only if pi < pj.




(¯ p − θi) + ∆(θ)/2
for all i, where ∆(θ) is the total net gain from paying the agents and realizing the cost savings
given by






θi − yi(1,θ)pi + (1 − αi)[yi(1,θ)(pi − θi)
¸











Then, independent of d, ti(1,θ) > 0 for all θ as long as α is close enough to 0, since ¯ p > 1.
Note also, that by deﬁnition of ∆(θ) all revenue is distributed among the two players. Hence,
the market mechanism we speciﬁed is feasible.
Finally, strong implementation in perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium requires strong individual
rationality. Hence, we have to verify that
Z
ti(1,θ)dθj = (1 +
d
2




dθj > (¯ p − θi)
for all θi. Since ex-post eﬃciency requires yi(1,θ) = 1 if and only if θi ≤ θj, we have
Z































for all θi. This expression is minimized for θ∗
i = (1 − α)/(2 − α). Hence, for α low enough
this expression is strictly positive for θ∗
i which concludes the proof.
23The intuition for this result is as follows. If the ﬁrms decide to cast oﬀ their settlement plat-
forms and merge, the merged platform will purchase settlement as an input in its production
for a price min{pi,pj}. Provided their proﬁt share is strictly positive, the agents prefer to
truthfully reveal the costs by quoting the Bertrand price. Hence, settlement can be provided
eﬃciently at the lowest cost and total proﬁts can be shared within the merged ﬁrm through
transfers depending on the true costs.
It is crucial here that the agent has an incentive to quote the Bertrand price while the players
do not have to monitor the agent. This is achieved by giving the agent a strictly positive
share of the proﬁts. Furthermore, this also allows the players to tie their hands, i.e., they
can credibly commit not to exploit their informational advantage. Hence, by delegating the
operation of settlement platforms to agents that share the proﬁts, the players are able to
overcome the barriers that prevented the ex-post eﬃcient merger.
Finally, observe that the result is true even if there are only gains from cost savings when the
ﬁrms merge, i.e., if d = 0. Even though there are no gains in revenue if θi = θj, this event has
measure 0 for all θi ∈ [0,1]. Hence, the expected gain from merging is always strictly positive
and the agent can be promised a strictly positive share (α > 0) of proﬁts from settlement
without making an expected loss from separating trading and settlement. The agents also
will participate, since their expected payoﬀ from running the settlement platform before they
learn θi is strictly positive. This is due to the fact that the event θi = 1 has measure 0 and
serving all the market has positive probability for all θi < 1.
5.3 An alternative: cross-listing
These results raise the question whether direct competition between the vertically integrated
ﬁrms could also lead to eﬃciency. Such competition could for example be implemented by
requiring that both ﬁrms can serve the whole market with demand (2 + d) without merging.
The analog in the context of securities exchanges would be the cross-listing of securities. This
allows for switching trading and clearing from one to another exchange.
Suppose for the moment that the two ﬁrms are forced to compete for the whole market,
24i.e. are required to cross-list the securities.10 Then, taking total demand (2 + d) as given,
if ﬁrm i quotes a price pi for trading and settlement, its proﬁts are given by equation (7)
with αi = 1. Hence, Proposition 1 applies without changes and the optimal strategy of the
resulting Bertrand game between the two ﬁrms is again pi(θi) = (θi + 1)/2. This shows
that inducing Bertrand competition between the two ﬁrms (through requiring cross-listing of
securities with full access for market participants to the exchanges) will result in the eﬃcient
solution.
However, it is crucial that participation in such a scheme is not voluntary. Otherwise, we fall
back to the impossibility result. To see why, consider the following game between the two
ﬁrms. In the ﬁrst stage, each ﬁrm decides whether or not to cross-list. If both ﬁrms cross-list,
each ﬁrm can attract all the demand. If one of the two ﬁrms does not cross-list, it can exclude
the other ﬁrm from bidding for its own demand.
But this implies that we can map this game back into a mechanism which speciﬁes yi(θ) = 1
if and only if θi ≤ θj and ti(θ) = (2 + d)pi ≤ (2 + d)¯ p. Hence, it is not possible to ensure
participation of both ﬁrms in such a scheme for all θ, since for certain θ one of the ﬁrms will
block cross-listing.
In other words, if participating in crosslisting is voluntary and a single ﬁrm can block cross-
listing, there are values for (θi,θj) such that at least one of the ﬁrms does not cross-list or
equivalently, does not participate in this mechanism. Hence, the two ﬁrms must be forced
to participate in the competition while they voluntarily participate in splitting up the silos
provided α is low enough.
Requiring competition between silos can nevertheless be a valid alternative to vertical disinte-
gration and merging one layer of the two ﬁrms. This is especially true if there are gains from
vertical integration in the ﬁrst place which we do not model. Such a solution also avoids the
problem that the proﬁt share α that agents require might be too high rendering an ex-post
ineﬃcient merger between the platforms better than merging via a market mechanism.
10This is equivalent to letting demand choose between both exchanges.
256 Conclusion
We presented a simple model where ownership structures matter for the eﬃcient consolida-
tion of trading, clearing and settlement platforms, when costs for clearing and settlement
are private information. We have purposely abstracted from details pertaining to trading,
clearing and settlement operations, as we believe they would not increase our understanding
of why eﬃcient consolidation does not take place in this industry, under the circumstances we
highlight. Our results are robust to more general speciﬁcations of demand functions. Crucial
is here only that the true costs of the vertical silos is not immediately fully revealed through
the price quoted on the market. Similarly, additional costs from merging will not change our
results provided these costs are not too large relative to the expected gains from merging.
Even though we analyze the eﬀect of private information regarding settlement costs, our
framework applies directly to a setting where the costs for trading are private information.
The interpretation of this paper is then that vertical silos prevent the eﬃcient consolidation
of settlement structures. The experiences of the US consolidation of the settlement structures
can be seen as evidence for this interpretation of our ﬁndings. In the 1970s, the New York
Stock Exchange, the American Stock Exchange as well as the National Association of Securi-
ties Dealers all operated their own clearing and settlement structures for exchanges originating
from their trading platforms. In 1976, these were merged into a new company called the Na-
tional Securities Clearing Corporation. Over time, the clearance and settlement operations
of other regional vertical silos were separated from trading platforms and consolidated with
the NSCC.
A diﬀerent example presents the case of the Nordic exchange, Norex, which is a joint venture
of Scandinavian and Icelandic exchanges. Here, only the trading operations are merged,
whereas the settlement arrangements are separate and still owned by the respective exchanges.
Given our results, this may be interpreted as evidence that a full merger of vertical silos is
not possible due to vested interests arising precisely in the area of settlement. The merger
of trading operations nevertheless took place due to the prospect of an increase in trading
volumes.
26To our knowledge, this paper is the ﬁrst to show that issues of clearing and settlement
can be indeed crucial for understanding new developments in the overall organization of
ﬁnancial infrastructures, in particular security exchanges. Similar to payment systems and
the monetary system, clearing and settlement operations lie at the heart of eﬃcient ﬁnancial
organization and, thus, will naturally have to receive more attention in the near future.
7 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1:













≥ (pi(ˆ θi) − θi)P
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pj(θj) = pi(ˆ θi)
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≥ (pi(ˆ θi) − θi)P
¡
pj(θj) > pi(ˆ θi)
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pj(θj) ≥ pi(ˆ θi)
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.
similarly we must have
(pi(ˆ θi) − ˆ θi)P
¡
pj(θj) > pi(ˆ θi)
¢
+ (pi(ˆ θi) − ˆ θi)P
¡
pj(θj) ≥ pi(ˆ θi)
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Subtracting the terms of the second inequality from the ones of the ﬁrst to preserve inequality,

















pj(θj) ≥ pi(ˆ θi)
¢i
≥ 0.
This implies pi is non-decreasing, since the inequality is only fulﬁlled if pi(ˆ θi) ≥ pi(θi).
Next, we show that the equilibrium strategy pi(θi) is continuous. Suppose not. Then, there
exists ˆ θi such that limθi↑ˆ θi pi(θi) = p0 6= p00 = limθi↓ˆ θi pi(θi). Assume that pi(ˆ θi) = p0. The
27proof for the other case is identical. Since there is no θi that sets pi ∈ (p0,p00], there does not
exist a θj that sets pj ∈ (p0,p00).
Suppose now, ˆ θi sets a price p0 + ε < p00, where ε > 0 and suﬃciently small. The additional
pay-oﬀ for ˆ θi is given by
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> 0. Then, consider ˆ θi choosing p0 − δ, where δ > 0 and suﬃciently
small. The additional pay-oﬀ is then given by
(p



























0 − δ − ˆ θi)P
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> 0 by assumption. Hence, for δ close to 0, ˆ θi is
better oﬀ setting p0 −δ. This implies that it was not optimal for ˆ θi to set p0 in the ﬁrst place.
A contradiction.
Finally, to show that the equilibrium strategy pi(θi) is strictly increasing, note ﬁrst that
pi(θi) ≥ θi for all θi. Otherwise, some θi would obtain a negative pay-oﬀ which he could
improve upon by setting pi(θi) = θi irrespective of players j strategy. Suppose now that pi(θi)
is constant on some interval, i.e., pi(θi) = ˜ p for θi ∈ [θi,θi], θi < θi ≤ ˜ p. Note that ˜ p > 0 since
otherwise some type in the interval will have a strictly negative pay-oﬀ. Consider any type
θj that sets his best response to pj(θj) = ˜ p > θj.
If type θj sets a price equal to ˜ p − ε > θj, where ε > 0, he obtains an additional payoﬀ equal
to



















pi(θi) ≥ ˜ p − ²
¢¤
> (˜ p − θj)P
¡
˜ p ≥ pi(θi) > ˜ p − ²
¢
− 2ε.
28Since ˜ p − θj > ε and P
¡




˜ p = pi(θi)
¢
> 0, the additional payoﬀ is
strictly positive for ² suﬃciently close to 0. Hence, setting pj(θj) = ˜ p can not be optimal for
θj < ˜ p given the best response pi(·) of i and we have pj(θj) < ˜ p for all θj.
If ˜ p ≥ 1, it follows that for some θi ∈ [θi,θi] it is better to set pi(θi) < max
θj
pj(θj) ≤ ˜ p for any
strategy pj(θj) ≤ ˜ p. Thus, pi(θi) = ˜ p was not optimal for some θi, a contradiction.
Let ˜ p < 1. Suppose θj = ˜ p sets a price equal to pj(˜ p) = ˜ p. Then, increasing his price by ε > 0
yields an additional pay-oﬀ equal to
εP
¡







pi(θi) = ˜ p + ε
¢
which is strictly positive for ε < 1 − ˜ p since there is strictly positive mass of type i above
˜ p + ε. Hence, p(˜ p) > ˜ p and for all θj < ˜ p we have p(θj) < ˜ p. Thus, pi(θi) is discontinuous at
θj = ˜ p, a contradiction.
Proof of Lemma 2:
Proof. Deﬁne ˜ φi(p) = φi(p) − 1 for all i. Then, equation (10) can be written as ˜ φj(p) =
(˜ φi(p) − p + 1)˜ φ0
j(p). The result then follows from Fudenberg-Tirole (1991), p. 225.
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